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In the US telecommunications industry a major restructuring has taken 
place in the last decade, with industry boundaries blurring and increas- 
ing pressures on regulatory commissions, leading to the intensification 
of competition in what was once the Bell monopoly market.’ Given such 
dynamic events, the principal question addressed in this article is: has 
the performance of firms providing telecommunication services in the 
USA changed as a result of deregulation? Analysing firms’ performance 
within contexts of contemporary importance is of major interest to 
management and public policy makers, and the impact of deregulation 
in US telecommunications provides an apposite context for study. 
In carrying out the study, a new multi-period, multi-product perform- 
ance measurement model is used. Traditional performance measures in 
business include the return on investment (ROI) formula, while econo- 
mic performance is measured by productivity indices. The method used 
integrates the ROI formula with productivity measurement frameworks 
to come up with a set of five ratios which yield rich insights into the 
performance of US telecommunications firms as their regulated en- 
vironment unravels.2 By analysing the time paths of these ratios, and 
differences in the ratios between firms with respect to industry averages, 
the responses of individual firms to the changing environment are 
gauged. 
General impact of deregulation 
Deregulation is a liberalization measure going to the heart of attempts 
to improve the economic performance of industries, and a key question 
is: why are there differences in the performance of firms in a regulated 
versus deregulated environment, particularly where the same collection 
of employees who managed the old regulated firms are in charge in the 
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new regime?3 Deregulation enhances the competitive environment of 
firms, spurring them to become internally efficient and better their 
overall performance.4 Because the environment of a firm establishes the 
context within which operations are carried out and performance 
outcomes attained, performance changes after deregulation are brought 
about not because of a sudden change in the abilities of incumbent 
management, but because of the changing constraints and opportunities 
faced in a more competitive environment. 
A firm’s ROI can be affected by many factors such as its overall 
profitability, productivity and ability to recover high prices, its focus on 
courses of action yielding greater returns and the proper utilization of 
plant capacity. Deregulation changes a firm’s environment and affects 
all of these. Profitability often rises in the early post-deregulation period 
for existing firms since market opportunities are greater. But, as more 
firms enter the market, concentration within the market is reduced and 
price-cost or profitability margins drop.5 Productivity increases because 
of competitive pressures and, though incentives to innovate are higher,‘j 
competition drives prices down to marginal costs.7 Emerging market 
opportunities also enable shifting corporate focus to profitable areas, 
because in a deregulated environment rate structures keeping inefficient 
firms in business no longer exist, while the possibilities of earning 
returns from notable entrepreneurial achievements are no longer 
precluded,’ and parsimony in the use of assets leads to a better 
utilization of plant capacity and other physical resources.’ 
Thus deregulation has differential impacts on different aspects of a 
firm’s performance. Nonetheless, among firms there can be further 
performance differences because of unique firm-level predilections, 
different sets of administrative competencies or idiosyncratic response 
routines. Hence among firms different dimensions of performance can 
significantly differ. lo 
The context 
Performance measures are formulated for the local operating companies 
in the USA for three time periods: 1981, 1984 and 1987. These 
companies have a mix of regulated and unregulated business, with the 
unregulated proportion steadily increasing. The primary regulated 
business is the provision of local household services. Provision of local 
business services is also partially regulated, but market entry is possible 
in areas such as private line and value-added sevices. Revenues from big 
business customers account for a substantial part of revenues of the 
companies, and these customers are free to choose from a host of 
alternative suppliers. Thus among the local companies the extent of 
competitive pressure is keenly felt. l1 
Local operating companies also provide long-distance services within 
their jurisdictional areas, called Local Access and Transport Areas 
(LATA). While for some of these companies intra-LATA long-distance 
services are regulated, in several key highly populated states such as 
Florida these services are fully deregulated, and progressive deregula- 
tion is occurring elsewhere. Hence for local operating companies the 
competitive pressures faced have exacerbated over time. The period 
1981-84 can be considered to be one of political transition, with 1981 an 
appropriate stating point for the study. 1981 was a period of full 
regulation and 1984 a year of partial regulation. By 1987 deregulation 
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had increased, and the phase between 1984 and 1987 is therefore one of 
increasing competition. 
Performance analysis measures 
Traditionally the ROI formula has been decomposed into its component 
parts as follows: 
ROI = profit/assets 
= (profit/revenues) X (revenues/assets) 
= (l-n-‘) X (revenues/assets) (1) 
where JC-’ is the reciprocal of the profitability margin computed as 
revenues divided by costs. The profitability margin for a firm can be 




t x, = 
t w, = 
actual quantities of outputs in during period t, m = 1, 2, M; 
t = 1, 2, T 
price per unit of output during period t 
actual quantity of variable cost input v, v = 1, 2, V, during 
period t 
price per unit of variable cost v during period t 
4 = actual quantity of fixed cost input f, f = 1,2, F, during period t 
w; = price per unit of fixed cost input f during period t 
To analyse performance over time the profitability change ratio can be 
defined as a ratio of ratios, the ratio of the profit margin ratio for period 
t to the profit margin ratio for some base level 0: 
PFTBLT = $ (3) 
The profitability change ratio can then be decomposed into four ratios 
which when multiplied together equal the profitability change ratio. The 
four ratios so developed are as follows. Details of how to calculate them 
are given in Appendix 1. 
Productivity change ratio. The ratio compares actual usage of inputs to 
the standard inputs required, which are calculated based on average 
input requirements for the industry data set as a whole given the actual 
outputs and output capacities of a firm for each time period. 
Price recovery change ratio. This ratio shows how effective the firm is in 
maximizing output prices while minimizing input prices, and thereby 
measures the price efficiency of firms. The ratio compares the value of 
outputs and inputs at base level prices, while holding both outputs and 
inputs constant at base levels. 
Product mix change ratio. This ratio shows what impact changing the 
continued from page 328 product mix or the service mix of a firm has on its profitability over 
John R. Meyer, R.W. Wilson, M. Alan time. 
Bauahcum. E. Button and L. Caouette. 
The-Ecoknics of Competition in the Tele: 
communications Industry, Oelgeschlager, Capacity utilization change ratio. The capacity utilization change ratio 
Gunn & Hain, Cambridge, MA, 1980. measures efficiency of physical capital in a firm. There is a fixed stock of 
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these, and hence a standard output is expected based on technical 
considerations. To the extent that such capacity utilization improves, a 
greater than standard level of output from such physical capital is 
expected and it can be inferred that assets already in place are being 
used to generate greater amounts of output. 
Performance measures are calculated for 39 major local telephone 
operating companies in the USA with 1987 annual revenues of $100 
million or more. 
To calculate the performance ratios certain basic data about a firm’s 
operation are required. These include details of its outputs, the com- 
position of its revenues streams, how the total operating expenses are 
composed, and details about the physical assets or resources that enable 
it to provide the products or services that it does. The following 
measures are used to compute ratios of performance. 
Two physical output measures are chosen. They are the annual total 
minutes of local and toll calls respectively. Financial output measures 
are local and toll call revenues. Toll revenues also include access 
revenues earned by the companies because they permit their networks 
to be used by other long-distance companies, and miscellaneous re- 
venues are split between local and toll revenues in the proportion that 
each bears to total operating revenues. 
The physical resources of these firms are their total access lines in 
place, and these signify their ability to service customers. Allied to the 
measures of output and physical capacity are the operating costs 
incurred. Maintenance and depreciation costs are categorized as fixed 
costs, which are based on plant capacity, while traffic, commercial, 
general office and other expenses are costs which vary with the volume 
of activity. 
Overall analysis of performance 
Figure 1 shows how the performance ratios for the industry as a whole 
have behaved from 1981 and 1987. It is found that profitability rises in 
1984 relative to 1981 following deregulation, and then falls in 1987 
relative to 1984. The productivity change ratio rises both in 1984 relative 
to 1981, and in 1987 relative to 1984. The price recovery change ratio 
falls consistently, in 1984 relative to 1981 and in 1987 relative to 1984. 
The product mix change ratio on the other hand rises in 1984 relative to 
1981, and keeps rising in 1987 relative to 1984, while the capacity 
utilization ratio rises dramatically from 1981 to 1984, but declines 
somewhat between 1984 and 1987. The results of the statistical tests 
carried out on the ratios are given in Table 1. 
Behaviour of the profitability change ratio 
From Table 1 it is noted that the mean of the 1984 ratio is greater than 
that for 1981, suggesting that profitability margins do increase signifi- 
cantly after deregulation and divestiture. The 1987 mean of the ratio is 
also greater than that for 1981. However, it is also found that the 1987 
mean of the ratio is significantly lower than that for 1984. 
Behaviour of the productivity change ratio 
Productivity is a key component that contributes to a firm’s profitability. 
Reviewing Figure 1 it can be seen that the productivity ratio increases 
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Figure 1. Average performance of all 
0.7 I I I 
fitllls. 1981 1984 1987 
consistently from 1981 to 1984, and from 1984 to 1987. The increase 
from 1981 to 1984 is statistically significant for the mean of the ratio, 
while the 1987 mean is significantly greater than that for 1984. The fact 
that the productivity ratio increases monotonically over the entire 
period 1981-87 is also supported by the fact that the 1987 mean is 
greater than that for 1981. 
Behaviour of the price recovery change ratio 
In Figure 1 it is noted that the price recovery change sharply declines 
from 1981 to 1984, and further declines from 1984 to 1987, though not as 
sharply. This suggests that competition from new entrants brings 
extremely strong pressures on the erstwhile monopoly telecommunica- 
tions firms to reduce their prices. 
From Table 1 it is also noted that the decrease in the price recovery 
ratio is monotonically significant throughout the period of our study. 
The mean of the ratio is lower for 1984 than in 1981, the mean of the 
ratio for 1987 is lower for 1987 than in 1984, and the 1987 mean is lower 
for 1987 than 1981. 
Nole: A comparison of each ratio was carried out 
between pairs of years using the test outlined in 
B.L. Welch, ‘The significance oi the difference 
between two means when the populatkn 
variances are unequal’, Bbnetfka, 1937, 
pp %0-3S2. 
*All these year-wise comparisons are statistical- 
ly significant using Welch’s test, at least at p c 
0.05. 
Table 1. Teet of whether the means of tfte ratios calculated for the opemtlng compantes are 
monotonlcally increaelng. 
Isth01984mean tsthe1987mean Isthe1997mean 
muogluHerfhan ratto greater then mtlo greater than 
the 1991 mean ratio? the lg94 meen fatlo? the 1961 meen ratio? 
Profitability change 
ratio Yesa No’ Yesa 
Productivity change 
ratio YeE? Yes YeSa 
Price recovery change 
ratio Nd Noa Noa 
Product mix change 
ratio Yes’ YesO Ye@ 
Capacity utilization 
ratjo Yes. No YeSP 
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Table 2. Summary of the behaviour of the varioua ratlos for s%uttpte firms. 
Bshaviour of ratios Behavtour of ratios Bshsvlour of ratlos 
1991-94 1994-97 1991-97 
Central Telephone 
Profitability change Rise Decline Rise and decline 
Productivity change Rapid rise Rapid rise Rise 
Price recovery change Rapid decline Rapid decline Decline 
Product mix change Rise Rise Rise 
Capacity utilization change Rapid rise Rise Rise 
Cincinnati Se// 
Profitability change Rapid rise Rise Rise 
Productivity change Rise Rise Rise 
Price recovery change Rapid decline Decline Decline 
Product mix change Rise Rise Rise 
Capacity utilization change Rapid rise Decline Rise and decline 
GTE Southwest 
Profitability change Rapid rise Rapid decline Rise and decline 
Productivity change Rapid rise Rapid decline Rise and decline 
Price recovery change Rapid decline Rapid rise Decline and rise 
Product mix change Rise Rise Rise 
Capacity utilization change Rapid rise Rapid decline Rise and decline 
Pacific Telephone 
Profitability change Rapid rise No change Rise 
Productivity change Rapid rise Rapid rise Rise 
Price recovery change Rapid decline Decline Decline 
Product mix change Rise Rise Rise 
Capacity utilization change Rapid rise Decline Rise and decline 
Behaviour of the product mix change ratio 
Table 1 shows that the product mix change ratio also increases monoto- 
nically over the periods we study. The 1987 mean is greater than the 
1981 mean, the 1987 mean is greater than the one for 1984, and the 1984 
mean is greater than the one for 1981. 
Behaviour of the capacity utilization change ratio 
A rapid increase in capacity utilization is also found between 1981 and 
1984 and in the overall period between 1981 and 1987. However, 
between 1984 and 1987 there is a drop in this ratio which is not 
statistically significant. 
The implications of such a drop are twofold. One is that, after the 
initial post-deregulation slack has been squeezed out, firms are content 
to keep a level of capacity that will enable them to provide other 
products or services as markets open. The second is that after deregula- 
tion firms have adjusted their scale of operations to one which is most 
productive, and future improvements in the capacity utilization ratio 
will only occur because of major technical change. 
Analysis of specific performance 
The approach taken so far has been to evaluate the influences that 
deregulation generally has on firms. Nevertheless it is recognized that 
there will be specific differences in how each of the performance 
measures behaves over time for each firm. Four firms are commented 
lsThese comments are based on an exten- 
on: Central Telephone, Cincinnati Bell, GTE Southwest and Pacific 
sive analysis of US operating companies Telephone. l2 Table 2 summarizes how the various ratios for each 
that is contained in Leonard Hyman, sample firm behave over time. It is a tabular snapshot of Figures 2-5, 
Richard Toole and Rosemary Avellis, The 
New Telecommunications Industry: Evolu- 
which show the individual ratios and their movements contributing to 
tion and Organization, Public Utilities Re- the overall performance of each firm. 
ports, 1987. Central Telephone is the ‘flagship’ of the Centel group, and operates 
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in four Midwestern states. Its performance is shown in Figure 2. In 
common with almost all other firms it shows an increase in profitability 
from 1981 to 1984. The main contribution to this overall increase comes 
from the increase in its productivity and capacity utilization, though its 
attention to a profitable product mix also helps, and these negate the 
effect of the decline in price recovery. In the period 1984-87 its 
profitability margin declines, primarily due to a decline in price recov- 
ery. Nonetheless its productivity and capacity utilization ratios increase 
as a result of aggressive spending on new technology, and Central 
Telephone seems to be following an efficiency-oriented, low-cost 
approach to its market. 
In Figure 3 the performance of Cincinnati Bell can be viewed. It is an 
independent telephone company, serving a major urban market in the 
Midwest where the scope for competition is high. It is a firm in which 
the profitability margin increases both from 1981 to 1984 and from 1984 
to 1987. Its price recovery ratio for 1981 is not as high as that of Central 
Telephone, suggesting that its market is already competitive. Neverthe- 
less this ratio declines from 1981 to 1984 and from 1984 to 1987. To 
counteract this, there is a monotonic increase in both the productivity 
and product mix ratios, and an early increase in capacity utilization. 
However, it is visually apparent that it is the product mix ratio which 
rises more steeply. This suggests that attention to a differentiated 
product range with higher margins is Cincinnati Bell’s approach in the 
post-deregulation period, and quite feasibly so given the high business 
orientation in its operating area. 
GTE Southwest displays idiosyncratic performance over the periods 
studied, as shown in Figure 4. In our sample it is the only firm whose 
profitability margin declines very sharply in the period 1984-87, to 
almost 1981 levels. It is the only firm whose productivity and capacity 
utilization ratios, while rising after 1981, decline sharply from 1984 to 
1987. On the other hand, it is the only firm whose price recovery ratio 
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rises after 1984. These, coupled with the fact that the product mix ratio 
also rises steadily throughout, suggests that GTE Southwest is attemp- 
ting an externally oriented approach directed towards managing its 
political relations with the regulatory authorities so as to attain higher 
than average prices. It does not seem to have fully effective internal 
operating mechanisms which would contribute to increased productivity 
and capacity utilization. The result is that overall profitability falls 
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The performance of the fourth company in the sample, Pacific 
Telephone, is displayed in Figure 5. Pacific Telephone operates in the 
very competitive Californian market with several other big players. 
Historically it was given stepmotherly treatment by AT&T. However, 
with deregulation in 1984 major changes took place in both its strategic 
and operational postures. From Figure 5 it is apparent that while 
profitability margins do rise sharply from 1981 to 1984, they stay at the 
same level for the period 1984-87. A reason for this is the continuous 
drop in the price recovery ratio, not unexpected in the Californian 
environment. Yet two ratios which displayed strong monotonic rises 
from 1981 to 1984 and from 1984 to 1987 are the productivity ratio and 
the product mix ratio. This suggests that the company is being aggres- 
sive in both cutting costs and focusing on market-driven strategies. 
What is also spectacular is the sharp rise in capacity utilization from 
1981 to 1984, and these three factors combine effectively to counter the 
sharp drop in price recovery, thus leading to higher profit margins. 
Conclusions 
It is demonstrated that the impact of deregulation has significantly 
affected the performance of firms in the US telecommunications 
industry. This validates several assumptions, in both the management 
and public policy literature, that deregulation will have positive impacts 
on the performance of firms. 
Also demonstrated is the fact that while overall profitability margins 
may rise and then fall, separate components of firms’ performance that 
contribute to profitability all change significantly, either positively or 
negatively. With increasing competition we expect the price recovery 
ability of firms to drop as more service suppliers seek revenues from 
existing customers. However, to counteract such trends firms increase 
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their operational efficiencies through increasing productivity and capac- 
ity utilization, and by paying attention to products with a higher margin. 
While the above comments refer to the overall industry analysis, it is 
also seen that individual firms’ performance also differs on various 
dimensions. This is the case in the, albeit limited, sample of four firms. 
All reflect unique and divergent trends in responding to the challenges 
of a deregulated environment. Within a homogeneous industry hetero- 
geneous firm-level differences in performance, as a result of the same 
environmental change, are identified. It is reiterated, however, that 
specific intrafirm actions that might lead to such differences are not 
identified, though suggestions as to what these might be are made. 
Extensions to the study are thus warranted. 
A subsequent approach will be to take the performance ratios and use 
them as dependent variables in econometric models, using specific 
exogenous or endogenous factors as independent explanators. Such 
tests will not only extend the performance analysis by factoring in the 
influence of independent variables on the ratios, but will also point to 
the influence of both firm-specific and industry-level factors on perform- 
ance, and extend the generalizability of the study. 
Appendix 
Calculating the performance ratios 
The productivity change ratio is defined as the ratio of the productivity ratio for 
the period t to the base level productivity ratio. It is expressed as: 
The price recovery change ratio is expressed as: 
The product mix change ratio is expressed as: 
and the capacity utilization change ratio is expressed as: 
CAPUTIL = 
ZZ:, w; z: + Ef w; q; 
Z:, w,” z: + Zf wf z; 





.z$ = standard quantity of variable cost input v, v = 1, 2, V, required 
in period t, t = 1, 2, T 
4 = standard quantity of fixed cost input f, f = 1, 2, F required in 
period t 
qj = standard average of fixed cost input f in period t given standard 
industry capacity utilization. 
To calculate the ratios certain assumptions are made. First, the resources 
available within the firm can generate multiple outputs. Second, substitution 
possibilities among inputs are not high. Third, production of services may be 
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characterized as using fixed proportions of technology, and fourth, input 
requirements can be approximated linearly within relevant ranges. 
The standard quantity i, of variable cost input v required in any period t is 
based on the standard input requirement cu,, per unit of product m. The 
quantity required is defined as zj = &,, LX,,,, y,& The standard input requirement 
am, is the average industry requirement for an input v to produce or service m 
and is calculated by regressing pooled inputs, by cost type, on pooled outputs 
without an intercept term. The two outputs that we use to calculate a,,,, are local 
and toll call minutes. 
Similarly the standard quantity zj of fixed cost input f required in period t is 
based on the standard input requirement &per unit of output capacity available 
to produce all products. It is defined as zj = &I?, where k’ denotes quantities of 
plant capacity available for outputs during period t. The standard input 
requirement &is based on output capacity available and not on product volume. 
It is calculated by regressing pooled inputs, by cost type if there are two or more 
types of fixed costs, on pooled output capacity available without an intercept. 
Having calculated the above, we gain a sense of what standard industry- 
average fixed costs are, to produce various outputs, given available physical 
plant capacity. However, the computation of an average industry fixed cost 
presupposes average industry capacity utilization given that physical resource 
capacity is fixed and unique. Hence we need to calculate a standard industry 
load factor for each period. This is again calculated as an average by dividing the 
sum of pooled outputs by the sum of pooled plant capacity and is defined as 
& y$lk’. The pooled outputs we use are total local and toll call minutes and 
the pooled plant capacity is the total number of telephone lines for all firms in all 
periods. The standard load factor gives us a sense of what average industry 
capacity utilization in general is and we use it to calculate the standard average 
quantity of fixed-cost input f in period t based on input requirement @, given 
standard industry capacity utilization. This is defined as q; = fif Y” zyh, where 
Y” is the inverse of the standard load factor. 
We are interested in comparing performance across companies and across 
time. Hence we also need to calculate common base-level prices and quantities. 
Using pooled data for all firms in all time periods (in our case we use data for the 
years 1981, 1984 and 1987), the base output and input prices are calculated as 
follows: 
PZ = WtPJIYLz f XZY?t3 (8) 
wo=x Ix v n W’X’ -I: x x’ ,““’ Ill” (9) 
wf = Iz”E:, w;x; + Ix,&+ (10) 
where n 1,2, . . . N denotes individual companies and t = 1,2, . . . T denotes 
the time periods. 
Similarly, the base actual output and output capacity quantities are calculated 
as averages over all firms and all time periods, as follows: 
y$ = x,x, y; + NT (11) 
k” =z,xtk’+NT (12) 
Finally, the base actual and standard input quantities are calculated using 
estimated input standard CY,, and 8 the estimated standard load factor 
(x, yz)lk’, where Yc’ = l/([& y$k 6’ 
details, as follows: 
) and the base output and base capacity 
x”, = z; =&Ymvy; (13) 
A$’ = z; = &k” 
= 4; =&‘IPLYz (14) 
By incorporating technical or other standard input requirements, actual outputs 
and actual output capacities in the calculation, each component of the produc- 
tivity ratio (Equation 4) captures only deviations between actual and standard 
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usages, and so the productivity change ratio provides a purer measure of 
productivity change for period t. The price recovery change ratio (Equation 5) 
also incorporates standard input requirements, given current period actual 
outputs and output capacities. Since 2” and z; are functions of y’, the ratio is 
driven only by differences in prices. 
The product mix change ratio (Equation 6) incorporates the same standard 
inputs for variable inputs as the other two previous ratios. However, to 
disentangle the effects of changes in product mix from capacity utilization, for 
fixed inputs the standard inputs given actual outputs (qj and q# are incorporated 
in the denominator ratio. These same standard inputs given actual outputs and 
the standard load factors for fixed inputs are incorporated in the numerator of 
capacity utilization change ratio (Equation 7), while the standard inputs for 
fixed inputs are used in the denominator. However, qy = ,t$? in Equation 14, and 
the capacity utilization change ratio therefore reflects only deviations between 
q; and .z/. 
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